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I. Introduction
Both intellectual property (IP) law and antitrust law strive to foster 
innovative activities in the marketplace. Both aim to promote consumer 
welfare.1) However, the main apparatus employed to attain this policy goal 
is different between IP law and antitrust law. That is, while IP law gives an 
exclusive right to its owners, antitrust law for the most part frowns upon 
any behavior with anticompetitive impact. Recently, in Korea, there have 
been an increasing number of legal disputes involving allegations that IP 
right holders have violated antitrust law. This type of disputes requires 
delineating the relationship between these two areas of law, which is not 
necessarily an easy and simple task. In theory, it can be understood that IP 
law and antitrust law play a complementary, rather than conflicting, role 
between them. In practice, however, there could be tensions among 
different market participants, each with different understanding of the 
relevant laws.  
In the case of patents, a patent holder is granted a 20-year exclusive 
period, during which the patent holder is allowed to exercise its rights. 
While exercising its exclusive rights, however, the patent holder may try to 
erect a barrier to entry to the market or otherwise try to engage in various 
types of anticompetitive behavior. Such anticompetitive behavior, in 
particular when carried out by a dominant market participant, may 
constitute an act of unlawful abuse of market dominance. In the IP arena, 
holders of IP rights often grant contractual license to third parties allowing 
them to use the IP. Contractual terms for the license may include those that 
impose restrictions as to what the licensees are allowed to do in the 
marketplace. Some of these restrictive terms may hinder competition and 
may be unlawful under antitrust law.  
Seen from this context, the intricate and complex relationship between 
IP law principles and antitrust law principles becomes more salient when 
the behavior of non-practicing entities (NPEs) or patent assertion entities 
(PAEs) is considered. While NPEs or PAEs are not standard legal terms, 
1) Luc Peeperkorn, IP Licenses and Competition Rules: Striking the Right Balance, 26(4) World 
Comp. 527, 527-8 (2003). 
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they generally refer to the entities that generate revenues by exercising their 
patent rights while not necessarily in the business of manufacturing or 
selling goods themselves or of providing services using their patents.2) 
Often called by the derogatory term trolls, most of the media coverage in 
Korea about their activities has placed them in a negative light. One 
possible reason for this negative sentiment is because many of the major 
electronic goods manufacturers in Korea such as Samsung Electronics and 
LG Electronics fell victim to what was portrayed to be exorbitant and 
unreasonable demands by NPEs.3) However, it is not clear if NPEs are 
indeed active in the Korean market.4)
Notwithstanding this, in 2014, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (the 
KFTC), Korea’s antitrust enforcement agency, amended its Review 
Guidelines on Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights (the IPR 
Guidelines), which provides important references to the KFTC when 
enforcing IP-related antitrust matters. In the 2014 amendment of the IPR 
Guidelines, a new section was included addressing potential anticompetitive 
behavior of NPEs.5) This is a noteworthy development since, prior to that, it 
was not clear if the KFTC would exercise its enforcement authority over 
competition issues involving NPEs. 
In the following, it will be considered what implications can be drawn 
2) Sometimes a conceptual distinction is made between an NPE and a PAE, although a 
consensus is yet to be reached regarding such distinction. A major differentiating factor could 
be whether an entity only acquires patents from other parties or, while acquiring patents from 
third parties, engages in its own research and development activities at the same time. For 
consistency and simplicity, the term NPE is used throughout this paper, without making such 
conceptual distinction. 
3) Certain well-known NPEs, such as Intellectual Ventures and InterDigital, maintain 
their offices in Korea, although it is not clear how active they are in Korea. At the same time, 
some of Korean electronic goods manufacturers and other investors made their own equity 
investments in certain NPEs.
4) Certain industries, in Korea and elsewhere, have faced more frequent patent 
infringement allegations brought by NPEs. Among Korean companies, large electronics 
companies as well as automobile manufacturers have been frequent targets of NPEs, while 
companies in other industries such as pharmaceutical companies have rarely been subject to 
NPE’s infringement claims. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-
Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 Cornell l. rev. 425, 427 (2014).
5) Jisigjaesangwonui Budanghan Haengsae Daehan Simsajichim [Review Guidelines on 
Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Dec. 17, 2014, 
Section III. 7 [hereinafter IPR Guidelines].
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from the IPR Guidelines regarding the activities of NPEs and, further, 
Korean courts’ judgements will be examined that have bearings on NPE 
activities. Through the review, we will try to draw conclusions regarding 
the current status of debates regarding the antitrust aspect of NPE activities 
in Korea. Our review of relevant rules and recent case developments 
suggests that, compared to the reticence in the past, the KFTC is now more 
ready and willing to assert jurisdiction if antitrust law issues arise in the 
technology market and that the court in general is likely to grant 
jurisdiction.6) This article is organized as follows. In Section II, we will 
summarize legal treatments of NPEs in general in the context of Korean 
antitrust law and, in Section III, antitrust issues surrounding IP matters are 
discussed. Section IV introduces provisions in the IPR Guidelines regarding 
NPEs’ activities and explores implications of the provisions together with 
relevant court cases. Section V provides concluding observations.  
 
II. Characterization of NPEs under Korean Antitrust Law
The IPR Guidelines explicitly make a reference to NPEs. According to 
the IPR Guidelines, NPEs conduct “businesses primarily by establishing a 
strong portfolio of patent after buying out patent rights from third parties, 
and then realizing profits by licensing or filing patent law suits based on 
the portfolio.”7) Although there is room for debates, this definition perhaps 
does not include the entities which have sizable internal R&D capabilities 
or manufacturing facilities. Defined relatively narrowly in this manner, 
there are only a small number of NPEs which have presence in Korea, and 
there have been only a modest number of lawsuits involving NPEs filed 
against Korean manufacturers.8)  
6) So far, academic discussions on NPEs have been scant in Korea, whereas, in certain 
other countries, most notably in the U.S., there have been active discussions. See generally, 
patent assertion entities and Competition poliCy (D. Daniel Sokol ed., Cambridge University 
Press, 2016 forthcoming).
7) IPR Guidelines, Section III. 7.
8) Precise hard evidence is hard to come by, but it appears that a few major Korean 
manufacturers, most notably Samsung Electronics, LG Electronics, Hyundai Motor, and Kia 
Motors, routinely become subject to NPE litigation, while so far most other Korean 
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About the economic role that NPEs play, the IPR Guidelines recognize 
that they can play an ameliorative and facilitative role, fostering innovation. 
That is, the IPR Guidelines state that NPEs can provide incentives to 
individuals and small and medium sized companies for their inventive 
activities and that NPEs can also facilitate financing and securitization 
activities based on patented technologies.9) In fact, the Korean government 
considers that NPEs can possibly serve a useful purpose in maximizing the 
overall patent value that the country’s various organizations possess as a 
whole. As part of the Korean government’s efforts in that regard, 
Intellectual Discovery, a government-backed patent fund, was established 
in July 2010. Two state-run banks announced in July 2015, that they would 
each invest 50 billion Korean Won (approximately US $45 million) to set up 
a patent aggregation fund which will purchase “outstanding intellectual 
properties” and will, with the patent portfolio, start “licensing them to 
other companies.”10) 
The KFTC, while acknowledging conducive and facilitative role that 
NPEs can play, views that NPEs are more likely to abuse their patent rights 
compared to other types of patent holders who are also manufacturers. The 
KFTC reasoned that this is because NPEs typically do not have a business 
need to engage in cross-licensing deals with other patent holders and also 
because NPEs would face a lesser risk of being subject to counter-claims or 
cross-claims once a lawsuit is filed.11) From this reasoning, it appears to be 
clear to the KTFC that certain anticompetitive behavior of patent holders, 
which goes beyond the scope of valid exercise of patent rights, should 
manufacturers have been practically free from such litigation. For such litigation, typically the 
venue is a U.S. court, not a Korean court.
9) “NPEs can provide incentives to engage in invention activities by giving patent holders 
the reasonable reward in a way that purchases or manages patents owned by individuals, 
small and medium sized enterprises, or research institutions that are lacking expertise to 
exercise patent rights or have no intention to commercialize patents by themselves. And NPEs 
can contribute to the facilitation of trade of patented technologies by playing a role of agent so 
that patent rights can be transferred to those who need them.” See IPR Guidelines, Section III. 
7.
10) Korea Joongang daily, KDB and IBK partner on intellectual property fund (Jun. 30, 2015), 
available at http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3005995 
(visited on Oct. 26, 2015).
11) IPR Guidelines, Section III. 7.
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become subject to antitrust scrutiny.  
Specifically, the IPR Guidelines list the following types of activities as 
examples of NPEs’ abusive or unreasonable behavior:12)
(i)    imposing royalties that are substantially unreasonable compared to 
normal business practices;
(ii)   imposing royalties, with patents acquired from a third-party, that 
are unreasonable and in denial of the previously applicable FRAND 
terms;
(iii)  forming a consortium and establishing an NPE, and refusing to 
grant licenses or granting licenses on discriminatory terms to non-
members of the consortium;
(iv)  filing a lawsuit or sending cease and desist letters for patent 
infringements using deceptive means such as omitting material 
information or causing misunderstanding about such information; 
or  
(v)   engaging in patent privateering behavior.
Although this is not a conclusive or exhaustive list, this list provides a 
hint regarding the policy direction that the KFTC may take in the future. 
Regarding the KFTC’s antitrust jurisdiction, it should also be noted that the 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (the MRFTA), Korea’s main 
antitrust statute, applies to foreign enterprises when their conduct shows 
impact on the Korean market regardless of whether the conduct was 
carried out inside or outside of Korea.13) Further, jurisdiction may be 
exercised regardless of whether these foreign enterprises have any 
operations in Korea.14) Therefore, NPEs which lack their presence in Korea 
could still be subject to jurisdiction in Korea if their activities are found to 
have impact in the Korean market.15)
12) Id.
13) Dogjeomgyuje Mit Gongjeonggeolaee Gwanhan Beoblyul [Monopoly Regulation and 
Fair Trade Act], Act No.13450, Sept. 25, 2015, Article 2-2 [hereinafter MRFTA]. 
14) IPR Guidelines, Section I. 2.
15) Statistics reported jointly by Korea Intellectual Property Office (KIPO) and the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy show that international lawsuits involving Korean 
companies as defendants have increased to 210 in the first half of 2013. Of those, 179 were 
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III.  Statutory Treatment of Intellectual Property under 
Antitrust Law in Korea
1. Unlawful Behavior under the MRFTA
The MRFTA provides a primary statutory source governing 
competition matters in Korea, including antitrust issues arising out of the 
exercise of IP rights. It can be said that, in general, the MRFTA’s scope is 
wider and more flexible than the scope of U.S. or EU competition law 
provisions that are related to the exercise of IP rights.16) 
IP licensing-related practices that could become subject to Korean 
competition authority’s investigation can generally be categorized into the 
following: (i) licensing-related unfair collaborative acts, (ii) abuse of market 
dominant position, and (iii) unfair trade practices. Relevant statutory 
provisions in each category are reviewed below.
  
1) Unfair Collaborative Acts
ting companies agree to jointly determine important transaction terms 
such as price and output, or jointly impose restrictions on, for instance, 
territory, transaction partners or types of products, and if the parties 
thereby restrict competition in the relevant market, such conduct could be 
found unlawful under Article 19 of the MRFTA, being labelled as an Unfair 
Collaborative Act. Often such conduct is carried out through a licensing 
contract.
filed by NPEs. See Business Korea, Korean Government Poised to Tackle the Attacks (Sep. 3, 2013), 
available at http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/smestartups/1383-patent-trolls-
korean-government-poised-tackle-attacks (visited on Oct. 26, 2015).
16) Various types of potentially illegal behavior under the MRFTA can be cited in this 
context. In particular noteworthy would include the following MRFTA provisions: Article 3-2 
(Prohibition of Abuse of Market Dominant Position), Article 7 (Restriction on Combination of 
Enterprises), Article 19 (Prohibition of Unfair Collaborative Acts), Article 23 (Prohibition of 
Unfair Trade Practices), Article 26 (Prohibited Activities of Enterprisers’ Organization), and 
Article 29 (Restrictions on Resale Price Maintenance).
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2) Abuse of Market Dominant Position
(1) Exclusionary Abuse
If a market dominant enterprise excludes its competitors and restricts 
competition in the relevant market by, for instance, (i) refusing to license its 
IP rights to other enterprises or treating other enterprises in a 
discriminatory manner, or (ii) transacting under exclusive terms, such 
practices could be deemed to be an abuse of market dominant position 
under Article 3-2 (Abuse of Market Dominant Position) of the MRFTA. 
In this context, it is worth considering the holding of a well-publicized 
case involving Posco’s refusal to deal.17) The case arose when Posco, a major 
supplier in the domestic hot-rolled steel coil market with a dominant 
market share close to monopoly, refused to supply hot-rolled steel coil to a 
competitor in the cold-rolled steel sheet market. Posco’s refusal to supply 
was in particular problematic since hot-rolled steel coil is an essential raw 
material for making cold-rolled steel sheets. The Supreme Court held that 
“anticompetitiveness will be recognized when the refusal to deal is 
conducted with the intent or purpose to maintain or strengthen monopoly 
in the market, i.e., artificially influence the market order by restricting free 
competition in the market, and such act can be viewed, objectively, as one 
that raises concerns of anticompetitive effect[.]”18)
Considering the holding of the Posco case, if an IP right holder who is a 
market dominant enterprise in the relevant market refuses to grant license, 
in order for such conduct to constitute an abuse of market dominant 
position in violation of the MRFTA, both the subjective and objective 
requirements must be proven. For antitrust purposes, the subjective 
requirement means showing the intent to maintain or strengthen the 
monopoly position in the market, and the objective requirement means 
proving that such act can be viewed, objectively, as one that raises 
justifiable concerns regarding anticompetitive effects.
(b) Exploitative Abuse
The MRFTA and the Presidential Decree accompanying the MRFTA 
stipulate that the conduct of market dominant enterprise which would 
17) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Du8626 (en banc), Nov. 22, 2007 (S. Kor.)
18) Id.
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unreasonably determine, maintain, or change the price is unlawful, unless 
there is a justifiable reason. Thus, for instance, it would not be permitted if a 
market dominant company increases the price sharply or decreases the 
price insignificantly in response to drastic changes in demand or in supply 
costs. 
 
3) Unfair Trade Practices
Under Article 23 of the MRFTA, a company, even without having a 
market dominant position, could still be found to have engaged in illegal 
unfair trade practices if the company excludes its competitors and restricts 
competition in the relevant market by, for instance, (i) refusing to license its 
IP to other companies or treating other companies in a discriminatory 
manner, or (ii) transacting under exclusive terms. Further, the following 
practices performed by a company with a superior bargaining position vis-
à-vis the other party in an inferior bargaining position during IP licensing 
negotiations could be viewed as an unlawful “abuse of superior bargaining 
position”: 
(i)    unilaterally imposing conditions unfavorable to the counter-party;
(ii)   coercing the counter-party to provide financial benefits in the form 
of money, goods or services; or
(iii) imposing a sales target and coercing to achieve the sales target.
Here, “impediment to fair trade” is required to establish unlawful 
unfair trade practices. The expression “impediment to fair trade” in this 
context is broadly construed, and the KFTC’s Guidelines for Review of 
Unfair Trade Practices define the phrase “impediment to fair trade” as a 
concept that combines anticompetitiveness and unfairness.19) In this context, 
“unfairness” is distinguished from “anticompetitiveness” and is interpreted 
to mean that methods of competition or transaction terms are unfair. Thus, 
Korean competition law is unique in the sense that even if there is no direct 
relevance to the anticompetitiveness in the relevant market, unfair business 
19) Bulgongjeong Geolaehaengwi Simsajichim [Guidelines for Review of Unfair Trade 
Practices], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Apr. 25, 2012, Section III. 1 [hereinafter Guidelines 
for Review of Unfair Trade Practices]. 
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practices in violation of the MRFTA may be established in a case where 
methods of competition or transaction terms themselves are unfair.
2. Article 59 of the MRFTA
Article 59 of the MRFTA stipulates that the MRFTA is not applicable “to 
any act which is deemed to be a justifiable exercise of rights under the 
Copyright Act, the Patent Act, the Utility Model Act, the Design Protection 
Act or the Trademark Act.” Thus, if this statutory language is interpreted in 
a broad and liberal manner, a justifiable exercise of IP rights can arguably 
be excluded from the application of antitrust law, even when such exercise 
of IP rights has impact on competition. On the other hand, it can also be 
argued that the MRFTA should apply to the unjustifiable exercise of IP 
rights, because: “IP rights should be legitimately exercised within a scope 
that does not distort the relevant market, while IP rights should also 
provide an incentive for new technological innovation. An act of unfairly 
impeding the use of relevant technology and new technological innovation 
by abusing IP rights is contrary to the basic purpose of not only the MRFTA 
but also the IP right system.”20) 
It has not been clear as to how the KFTC will interpret Article 59 of the 
MRFTA and under what circumstances the KFTC will exert its jurisdiction. 
However, with the amendment of the IPR Guidelines and through court 
cases, the meaning of this provision has become clearer. Below, we review 
the GSK/Dong-A case, which involves claims regarding the exercise of IP 
rights in the pharmaceutical industry and its alleged anticompetitive 
effects. This case is noteworthy since it cast an important light regarding the 
interpretation of Article 59 of the MRFTA.
3. GSK/Dong-A Reverse Payment Case
The statutory provision in Article 59 of the MRFTA has been controversial 
as to when a certain potentially anticompetitive conduct should be 
considered to fall beyond the reach of antitrust law. In the past, a few courts 
20) IPR Guidelines, Section I. 2.
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rendered decisions to the effect that the MRFTA should not be applied to a 
conduct once it is established that such conduct constitutes a legitimate 
exercise of rights under the purview of patent law. Once this line of 
reasoning is followed, there would simply be no need to consider 
anticompetitive effects even for a case where a patent holder’s exercise of its 
rights would have a negative impact on competition. This attitude 
significantly narrowed room to maneuver in a potential antitrust case 
involving IP holder’s exercise of its rights.  
The court revisited this issue through the reverse payment litigation 
matter involving GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), a large multi-national 
pharmaceutical company, and Dong-A Pharmaceutical (Dong-A), a major 
domestic pharmaceutical company.21) GSK owned an original patent for an 
anti-nausea drug Zofran, which contains an active ingredient called 
ondansetron.22) Targeting the same market in Korea, Dong-A separately 
developed a new drug with similar effects and obtained a patent. Dong-A 
began marketing its new drug Ondaron in 1998, at a lower price than 
Zofran. In 1999, GSK sent a notice to Dong-A, claiming that Dong-A 
infringed GSK’s patent. Patent lawsuits ensued between the parties. The 
parties, however, did not wait for the court to render a decision. Instead, 
the parties settled and, under the terms of the settlement, Dong-A would 
stop selling its new drug Ondaron and GSK would in return give Dong-A 
rights to distribute Zofran and GSK’s other drug called Valtrex, an anti-
viral medication. For distributing Zofran, Dong-A would get 25% of sales 
amount when 80% of the sales target is met and would also receive 7% of 
sales revenue as an incentive starting from three years of initial sales. 
Regarding the distribution of Valtrex, Dong-A was promised to receive 100 
million Korean Won annually for five years regardless of the sales amount. 
21) A reverse payment refers to a practice whereby a patent holder of a drug makes 
payments to generic drug manufacturers in exchange for delaying the release of generic 
drugs. Through a reverse payment deal, a patent holder is practically allowed to extend the 
period during which it can enjoy an exclusive right to distribute the patented drug, even after 
the expiration of the patent at issue. This type of deals raises an antitrust concern regarding 
the possibility of reducing competitive pressure in the market and keeping prices higher.
22) For background factual information on this case, see OECD, Development in Law 
Enforcements Related to the Adoption of System Monitoring Anticompetitive Behaviors in the 
Pharmaceutical Sector, DAF/COMP/WD(2014)58 (June 4, 2014).
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Subsequently, terms of the parties’ settlement agreement became subject 
to scrutiny by the KFTC. After examining this deal, the KFTC concluded 
that the parties effectively delayed marketing of a competing product and, 
through an economic analysis, estimated that the settlement agreement 
enabled GSK to obtain about 16 billion Korean Won in sales. The KFTC 
found that GSK and Dong-A jointly engaged in an unfair conduct in 
violation of Article 19(1) of the MRFTA and imposed a penalty of 5.2 billion 
Korean Won (approximately US $4.5 million).23) After the KFTC rendered 
its decision, the case proceeded to the court. Seoul High Court and the 
Supreme Court both agreed with the KFTC decision and ruled that the 
agreement between the parties constituted an unreasonable restraint on 
competition.24)
The case has resulted in heated discussions among observers over 
fundamental policy goals of patent law and antitrust law, and over the 
harmonization of apparently different policy objectives of the two different 
areas of law. That is, while it is acknowledged, in principle, that patent 
law’s creation of exclusive rights to patent holders is not necessarily at odds 
with antitrust law’s general goal of fostering competition, this case 
rekindled the debate and moved the forum for the debate from academia to 
the court. 
In determining whether a patent-related collaborative practice between 
a global pharmaceutical company and a Korean pharmaceutical company 
violates the Korean antitrust law,25) the Supreme Court held that “‘practices 
not deemed to be justifiable exercises of patent rights’ mean such practices 
which appear to be an exercise of patent rights on its face and which, 
nonetheless, effectively violate the objective and fundamental purpose of 
the patent system. An inquiry regarding such practices requires 
consideration of the totality of circumstances, such as the patent system’s 
23) KFTC Decision, 2011-300, Dec. 23, 2011 (S.Kor.).
24) Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2012Nu3028, Oct. 11, 2012 (S.Kor.); Supreme Court 
[S. Ct.], 2012Du24498, Feb. 27, 2014 (S.Kor.).
25) As a general matter, economic interests of the manufacturer of a patented original 
drug do not match with those of generic manufacturers. They can, however, align their 
interests to some extent, since the manufacturer of the patented drug would face risks of 
losing its market share after the patent expires, while generic drug manufacturers would want 
to avoid the possibility of a long and expensive patent lawsuit related to the generic.
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purpose and objective, the patent’s content, and the effects of the practices 
on free and fair competition.”26) In so doing, the Supreme Court recited 
Article 59 of the MRFTA and rendered its decision as to how this provision 
should be construed. That is, the Supreme Court made it clear that antitrust 
law can be applied in a case involving a patent holder’s exercise of its rights 
and that the relevant scrutiny about the legitimacy of the exercise of patent 
rights may well include the examination of possible impact on competition. 
Thus, in the GSK/Dong-A decision, the effects of a particular conduct 
on competition were considered on two levels, that is, as to whether the 
conduct was anticompetitive and also as to whether it was a legitimate 
exercise of patent rights. In effect, the court held that, in granting or 
denying jurisdiction pursuant to Article 59 of the MRFTA, (1) the exercise 
of patent rights should be examined in light of the purposes of patent law 
as well as the nature of the patent at issue, and (2) the conduct of the parties 
related to the patent should be considered regarding its impact on fair and 
free competition.  
 
4. The IPR Guidelines
The IPR Guidelines were initially promulgated in 2000. Although the 
IPR Guidelines do not have formal statutory authority and are not legally 
binding, they provide an important framework which practically governs 
the KFTC’s review of a relevant case. In particular, in recent years, antitrust 
issues related to IP became more significant and the KFTC amended the 
IPR Guidelines in December 2014.27) Through the recent amendment, a 
framework has been set for the regulation of certain recently observed 
noteworthy phenomena, including possibilities of the abuse of patent rights 
by NPEs. 
The IPR Guidelines explicitly recognize that the system of IP including 
patent is aimed at encouraging creative entrepreneurial activities by 
26) Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2012Du24498, Feb. 27, 2014 (S.Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 
2012Du27794, Feb. 27, 2014 (S.Kor.). 
27) The IPR Guidelines were amended several times since its initial promulgation and, in 
2010 and 2011, the KFTC conducted industry-wide IP right abuse surveys in the 
pharmaceutical, IT, chemical, and machinery industries.
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providing strong incentives for technical innovation.28) In that regard, it is 
acknowledged that the MRFTA and the system of IP ultimately pursue a 
common policy objective.29) The MRFTA may contribute to the achievement 
of such common policy objective by regulating conducts that deviate from 
the basic purpose of the IP system, while respecting and honoring the 
legitimate exercise of IP rights.
On this basis, the IPR Guidelines set forth the following inquiries for 
determining whether or not an exercise of IP rights is legitimate and 
justifiable:
(i)   whether the exercise of the IP rights concerned does not conflict with 
the basic purpose of promoting industrial development by 
protecting and encouraging new inventions and encouraging the use 
of relevant technologies; and
(ii)  what influence, if any, the exercise of the IP rights concerned has 
upon competitive environments in the relevant market.
The IPR Guidelines also recognize that it would not be appropriate to 
declare certain types of activities to be per se illegal and that opting for a 
rule of reason analysis would be better in determining the unlawfulness of 
a conduct by a holder of IP rights. “[I]f the exercise of IP rights impedes fair 
trade and increases efficiency at the same time, whether such an exercise 
violates the MRFTA shall be determined, in principle, upon comparing and 
weighing the extent of both effects.”30) 
IV. NPEs’ Activities in the Context of the IPR Guidelines 
The amended IPR Guidelines illustrate 5 types of activities as examples 
of abusive or unreasonable conduct by NPEs.31) These individual types of 
conduct are considered below separately.
28) IPR Guidelines, Section II. 1.
29) Id.
30) IPR Guidelines, Section II. 2.
31) IPR Guidelines, Section III. 7. See Section II above for a list of these 5 types of conducts.
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1.  Act of imposing royalties that are substantially unreasonable compared 
to normal business practices.
An act of imposing a significantly high amount of royalties to licensees, 
if it took place in the course of conducting ordinary business practices and 
without particular justifiable reasons, could constitute a case of patent right 
abuses and may violate antitrust law. In a licensing deal, royalties in 
general play a role analogous to prices in a product market. That way, 
royalties are expected to provide fair and adequate compensation to the 
developer or owner of innovative technology. While it should be properly 
recognized that possibilities of royalty revenues often serve a core purpose 
of IP rights, contractual terms and factual circumstances surrounding 
individual licensing contracts must be considered case-by-case in 
determining whether a royalty-related practice is anticompetitive and 
violates the MRFTA. 
As a general matter, imposing royalties on implementers of a patented 
technology itself is and should be seen as a legitimate exercise of patent 
rights. Developing innovative technologies often involves considerable 
risks and requires substantial investments in terms of time and costs and as 
such technical achievements should be appropriately rewarded. Imposing a 
sufficient amount of royalties in return for another’s use of the technology 
would function as an important means for the patent holder to recoup the 
costs incurred during the process of developing and patenting the 
technology. 
Nevertheless, certain practices involving royalties could impede fair 
trade, and thus may be considered an unlawful exercise of IP rights. Such 
practices would include the following:
(i)    unfairly deciding, maintaining, or changing royalty terms in 
collaboration with other entities; 
(ii)   imposing royalties with discriminatory terms depending on such 
factors as the identity of a licensee;
(iii)  unfairly imposing royalties for parts which have not used the 
licensed technology;
(iv)  unfairly imposing royalties for a term extending beyond the 
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expiration of the IP right; and 
(v)   allowing the IP holder to unilaterally decide or change the 
calculation method for royalties, without clear stipulation in the 
contract.32)
In determining whether the amount or rate of royalties for a particular 
case is reasonable or not, various factors can be considered. These factors 
would include: objective technological value of a patent; royalties that the 
licensor receives from other licensees; royalties paid by the licensee to 
obtain license for a similar patent; characteristics and extent of the licensing 
agreement; license term or period; and profitability of a product produced 
using the patent. 
2.  Act of imposing royalties, with patents acquired from a third-party, 
that are unreasonable and in denial of the previously applicable 
FRAND terms. 
Standard essential patents (SEPs) refer to the patents that must be used 
in order to comply with a specific technical standard. Thus, without using 
the patented technology covered by an SEP, it would not be possible to 
manufacture a standard-compliant product. Due to this characteristic, an 
SEP may easily confer market power to its holder. 
In the case of network businesses such as computer networking and 
telecommunications, establishing interoperability standards or compatibility 
standards is almost inevitable and is even necessary in many circumstances. 
Standard setting typically involves a series of prolonged procedures during 
which multiple business operators discuss, determine, and disseminate 
common standards. Standard-setting organizations (SSOs) often require 
SEP holders to make a pre-announced commitment that, once it is 
determined that their patents would form part of SEPs, they will license 
their patents under FRAND (‘fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory’) 
conditions. The FRAND commitment is required since it could ameliorate 
the problem of patent hold-up. Patent hold-up would take place when an 
SEP owner tries to abuse its patent rights by, for instance, refusing to 
32) IPR Guidelines, Section III. 7.
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license or demanding exorbitant royalties once it becomes clear that 
implementers are locked into the SEP due to high switching costs. 
NPEs holding SEPs may attempt to engage in patent hold-up or impose 
unreasonable discriminatory royalties. Reflecting concerns over such 
possibilities of hold-up behavior, the IPR Guidelines indicate that the 
royalty terms imposed by an SEP holder who made a FRAND commitment 
would be subject to heightened scrutiny.33) 
Tie-in sales may also be judged as unlawful. For instance, an NPE which 
holds an SEP may have an incentive to tie the licensing of its SEP to the 
licensing of unwanted non-SEPs. However, it would be illegal if an NPE 
holding a dominant position in the relevant technology market compels a 
licensee to obtain other patents or an entire group of patents. 
Issues related to SEPs gained prominence in the context of Korean 
antitrust enforcement in recent years, in particular due to a few well-
publicized court cases. The two cases that are discussed below are 
especially noteworthy in that regard.  
1) Apple vs. Samsung34)
Lawsuits between Apple and Samsung involving standard patents 
received a great deal of attention worldwide. Apple filed a patent 
infringement claim against Samsung in a U.S. federal district court. 
Samsung in turn filed a lawsuit against Apple in Korea at Seoul Central 
District Court in April of 2011, alleging Apple’s violation of its patent 
rights, and the court rendered its decision in August 2012.35) Responding to 
Samsung’s lawsuit in Korea, Apple also filed a petition against Samsung to 
the KFTC alleging Samsung’s interference with Apple’s business by 
33) IPR Guidelines, Section III. 5. In particular, “[a]cts of avoiding or circumventing 
licensing on FRAND terms to strengthen market dominance or to exclude competitors” 
would be considered as acts that are likely to impede fair trade. See IPR Guidelines, Section 
III. 5. A.
34) The summary of the case is for the most part from Haksoo Ko, Facilitating Negotiation 
for Licensing Standard-Essential Patents in the Shadow of Injunctive Relief Possibilities, 22 tex. 
intell. prop. l.J. 209 (2014).
35) Seoul District Court [Seoul Dist. Ct.], 2011Kahap39552, Aug. 24, 2012 (S.Kor.). Both 
parties appealed the case to Seoul High Court (Case No. 2012Na78063). However, Apple and 
Samsung subsequently agreed to end all their pending patent lawsuits outside the U.S., and 
Samsung eventually withdrew the case in Korea in August 2014. 
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engaging in anticompetitive patent hold-up. The KFTC rejected Apple’s 
claim.
In the lawsuit in Seoul, Samsung claimed that certain Apple products, 
including iPhone 3GS, iPhone 4, iPad 1, and iPad 2, infringed upon several 
patents that Samsung held concerning 3GPP (Third Generation Partnership 
Project) communication standards and also upon a patent that Samsung 
held concerning a certain method of providing data services utilizing 
mobile devices. 
Against these claims of Samsung, Apple submitted the following lines 
of rebuttals. First, Apple argued that it simply did not infringe upon 
Samsung’s patent rights since it employed a distinct manufacturing 
methodology which allowed it to maneuver outside the scope of Samsung’s 
patents. Second, Apple claimed that Samsung’s patents at issue are in fact 
invalid and that therefore bringing a lawsuit based on such invalid patents 
should not be allowed.  Third, Apple cited the patent exhaustion doctrine 
and asserted that, since it purchased from Intel the base chips which 
implemented the patents at issue, Samsung’s rights were exhausted and 
thus Samsung cannot make a claim against Apple regarding these patents. 
Fourth, Apple contended that Samsung’s lawsuit itself constitutes a 
violation of Korea’s antitrust law since it should be regarded as an act of 
seeking a denial of access to essential facilities; of seeking to impose undue 
and unreasonable transactional conditions on Apple; and of practicing 
deceptive customer solicitation behavior. Fifth, Apple proclaimed that 
Samsung’s lawsuit violates the FRAND commitment that Samsung made at 
ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) during the 
standard determination process regarding the patents at issue. 
With regard to the claim that Samsung violated its own FRAND 
commitment, Apple characterized Samsung’s FRAND commitment as an 
offer for an irrevocable license agreement. Thus, Apple’s position was that a 
valid license agreement was entered into between Apple and Samsung 
when Apple began to implement Samsung’s patents since Apple’s use of 
Samsung’s patents would constitute an acceptance to the existing Samsung’s 
offer. Apple also claimed that Samsung’s FRAND commitment intrinsically 
includes a promise not to seek a court’s order for injunction. According to 
Apple, Samsung therefore had an obligation to negotiate with Apple in 
order to finalize the terms of a license agreement, and filing a lawsuit 
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seeking an injunction would constitute an illegal abuse of rights for a patent 
holder.
The Seoul District Court judged that several models of iPhone and iPad 
indeed violated Samsung’s patent rights and awarded damages to 
Samsung in the amount of 40 million Korean Won (approximately 
US$36,000), together with an order against Apple to cease infringing on 
Samsung’s patent rights. At the same time, it was acknowledging that 
Samsung’s rights for certain other patents were not violated. About Apple’s 
claim related to Samsung’s FRAND commitment, the court disagreed. The 
court, in its judgment, reviewed the relevant technology market in detail 
and determined that Samsung was dominant in the market for 3GPP-
compliant mobile communication devices and certain tablet computers. The 
court found Samsung’s patents were necessary in the relevant product 
market, considering in particular that no substitute patents existed. The 
court, however, reasoned that simply using Samsung’s SEPs does not mean 
that a binding contract was entered into. The court further reasoned that a 
FRAND declaration, without more, cannot be construed to include a 
commitment not to seek an injunctive relief. 
While patent disputes between Apple and Samsung drew a great deal 
of media attention worldwide, the lawsuit between Apple and Samsung in 
Korea prompted many in the Korean antitrust community to pay more 
attention to the role of standards in the technology market and to potential 
anticompetitive behavior of SEP holders. 
2) Qualcomm Case
Qualcomm has been an important supplier of technologies and modem 
chips in the telecommunications industry in many parts of the world 
including Korea. In 2009, after a lengthy investigation which started after a 
petition was filed in 2006, the KFTC decided that Qualcomm, with a 99.4% 
market share in the Korean CDMA modem chip market, abused its 
dominant position. The KFTC listed three types of activities as Qualcomm’s 
abusive behavior: (1) imposing discriminatory licensing terms, (2) 
providing conditional rebates, and (3) demanding royalty payments after 
its patents expired.36) First, the KFTC ruled that Qualcomm unlawfully 
36) KFTC Decision, 2009-281, Dec. 30, 2009.The KFTC issued a press release in English 
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imposed discriminator terms when licensing its CDMA technology. This 
was carried out through (i) a royalty discount program under which 
Qualcomm charged 5% to licensees who adopt Qualcomm modem chips 
while charging 5.75% for non-Qualcomm modem chip users; (ii) a 
discriminatory royalty cap program, imposing a $20 cap on Qualcomm 
chip users, and imposing a $30 cap on non-Qualcomm chip users; and (iii) a 
price-netting program, discriminating against domestic mobile phone 
manufacturers using non-Qualcomm chips. Second, the KFTC found that, 
with regard to Qualcomm’s sales of CDMA modem chips and radio 
frequency chips, it applied discriminatory rebate rates only to mobile 
handset manufactures that fulfilled much of their chip demands through 
Qualcomm. For instance, for one manufacturer which satisfied over 85% of 
its modem chip need through Qualcomm, Qualcomm provided a rebate of 
3%. Third, the KFTC found that Qualcomm imposed an anticompetitive 
contract term to mobile handset manufactures, which enabled it to continue 
to garner 50% of patent royalties even after its patent expired or is 
determined to be invalid. 
The KFTC determined that Qualcomm’s behavior constituted unlawful 
abuse of market dominance and unfair trade practices under the MRFTA, 
and imposed 273 billion Korean Won (approximately US $208 million at the 
time) as fine, which was the highest amount imposed against a single 
company. In the KFTC decision, the fact that Qualcomm had made a 
FRAND commitment appears to have weighed heavily. The KFTC noted 
that an SEP owner’s act of reneging on its FRAND commitment would 
raise a competitive concern, although the KFTC did not articulate in detail 
how Qualcomm’s behavior should be interpreted in light of its FRAND 
commitment.  
The case proceeded to Seoul High Court, which, in June 2013, affirmed 
the KFTC’s decision for the most part.37) Seoul High Court held that 
Qualcomm’s discriminatory licensing practices violated Article 3-2(1)(iii) of 
providing a summary of the case. See Press Release, KFTC, Qualcomm’s Abuse of Market 
Dominance (July 23, 2009).
37) Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 2010Nu3932, June 19, 2013 (S.Kor.). The judgment 
cancelled an insignificant part of the KFTC resolution.
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the MRFTA, constituting unlawful abuse of market dominant position.38) 
The court, in reaching its decision, examined both intent and effect of 
Qualcomm’s behavior. Regarding FRAND, the court started out by noting 
that a FRAND commitment is a safeguard to prevent abusive conduct such 
as discriminatory licensing by an SEP owner who has acquired market 
power by virtue of standardization. After reviewing the fact of the case, the 
court ruled that Qualcomm violated its FRAND commitment. Although the 
FRAND issue was not the sole factor that the court relied on in rendering 
its decision, it was nonetheless dealt with as an important factor.  
Regardless of the ultimate court decision from the case, one significant 
aspect of this case is that it brought antitrust issues forefront when 
examining patent holder’s contracting behavior. In the past, it was 
considered that antitrust law practically does not have much to do with 
standard setting processes and with SEP holders’ licensing behavior. Now, 
it appears only natural that SEP holders’ behavior can easily be subject to 
antitrust scrutiny, if relevant issues arise. 
3.  Act of forming a consortium and establishing an NPE, and then 
refusing to grant licenses or granting licenses on discriminatory terms 
to non-members of the consortium. 
Several operating companies may together create an NPE in the form of 
a consortium and subsequently acquire patents. These companies and the 
NPE could then collude and refuse to grant license to other businesses 
which do not belong to the consortium, or they may try to impose an 
exorbitantly high amount of royalties. Depending on factual circumstances, 
this type of behavior could show an anticompetitive effect. However, it is 
unclear if there is evidence in Korea indicating that antitrust scrutiny 
against an NPE in this context would be warranted. 
38) The case is now pending at the Supreme Court level. Supreme Court [S.Ct], Case No. 
2013Du14726.
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4.  An act of filing a lawsuit or sending a cease and desist letter for patent 
infringements using deceptive means such as omitting material 
information or causing misunderstanding about such information. 
This is related to a situation where an entity demands payment of 
royalties from multiple parties without necessarily revealing patent 
ownership information or the precise nature of alleged patent violations. In 
particular an act of demanding payment of royalties or of threatening to file 
a lawsuit without having a clear patent right is highly likely to be 
determined to be an unfair conduct in violation of antitrust law. This type 
of deceptive behavior may possibly take place in diverse business and legal 
contexts. It is, however, unclear if a concern over this type of behavior is in 
particular noteworthy when analyzing antitrust implications of NPEs. 
5. An act of engaging in patent privateering behavior.
 In some cases, operating companies may create a patent pool to file a 
patent infringement suit against their rivals. Privateering refers to a practice 
which an operating company with patents transfers its patens to an NPE 
with the expectation that the NPE would then assert its patent rights 
aggressively with the newly acquired patents, while the operating 
company itself would stay behind the veil of the NPE.
Depending on business and legal environments, trying to engage in this 
type of behavior may make reasonable business sense. This is because, in 
general, in the technology market, possibilities of cross-licensing and/or 
counter-suits would often serve as a constraint against the incentive of a 
market dominant player. In contrast, however, NPEs are more likely to take 
advantage of the patent litigation system since they would bear little risks 
of being counter-sued and also would not have much need for cross-
licensing deals. Privateering could also serve as an effective means for 
raising rivals’ costs while the operating company remains virtually free 
from the threat of counter-suits or from the need of cross-licensing.
Thus, in the context of privateering, it can easily be justified to hold the 
original patent holder equally, if not more, accountable, compared to the 
NPE with the transferred patents. Perhaps reflecting this line of reasoning, 
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the IPR Guidelines provide that in principle the original patent holder 
should mainly be held responsible if problems arise.39) When doing so, 
however, many factors would be considered together such as: relationship 
between the original patent holder and the NPE at issue; details of allegedly 
unfair behavior; and extent of NPE’s involvement in the unfair behavior.40) 
Although privateering is theoretically possible, in Korea, it is unclear if 
there have been any incidences of such privateering in the technology 
market.
V. Concluding Observations
The Korean antitrust agency is apparently concerned about the 
possibility that NPEs may engage in anticompetitive behavior and newly 
included a relevant section in its recent amendment of the IPR Guidelines. 
It remains, however, unclear how much evidence is available in Korea 
about NPEs’ activities that raise antitrust concerns. Most of the concerns, 
from a Korean perspective, are regarding a relatively small group of 
Korean companies being repeatedly sued in the U.S. by NPEs based in the 
U.S. 
In that regard, there would not be much room, at least for now, for an 
antitrust agency in Korea to exercise its jurisdiction. Further, many of the 
NPEs’ activities that may raise antitrust concerns can readily be addressed 
employing existing antitrust laws and regulations. As such, focusing on the 
definitional characters of NPEs may not yield fruitful antitrust implications. 
NPEs’ impact on the overall innovation system in Korea is still unclear 
and controversial. On a positive side, NPEs may arguably serve as a useful 
intermediary for patentees in the technology market and thus encourage 
innovation. On the other hand, a commonly referred problem of NPEs is 
that they tend to initiate patent infringement lawsuits seeking to enforce 
patents of dubious quality and then settle for amounts that would be 
smaller than the defendants’ litigation costs.41) In Korea, compared to the 
39) IPR Guidelines, Section III. 7.
40) Id. 
41) See, e.g., Jiaqing “Jack” Lu, The Economics and Controversies of Non-practicing Entities 
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U.S., the cost of patent litigation is relatively low and the plaintiff’s chances 
of winning in patent litigation are not particularly high.42) Therefore, the 
business model of NPEs, taking advantage of the litigation system, would 
perhaps not be as lucrative in Korea as in the U.S. Many of the problems 
relating to NPEs’ activities that are at issue in the U.S. may not be much 
relevant in Korea and the overall legal system in Korea, including the 
current patent litigation system, may not be conducive to NPEs’ usual 
business strategies.43) 
Meanwhile, Korean companies are repeatedly reported to become 
targets of lawsuits brought by NPEs at overseas courts, in particular in the 
U.S. This has raised a concern in Korea that NPEs’ activities may impose 
additional costs on these Korean companies and may eventually impede 
fair trade principles in the Korean market. Considering this concern, it was 
perhaps not unreasonable that the KFTC felt a need to include a separate 
section on NPEs in its recent amendment of the IPR Guidelines. The 
amendment suggests that the KFTC would be willing and ready to bring a 
case if NPEs’ activities deserve an antitrust scrutiny. Considering the 
current business and legal environment, however, the provisions in the IPR 
Guidelines dealing with NPEs’ activities may have more bearings on 
foreign NPEs’ activities. Jurisdiction may be exercised if the conduct at 
issue has impact on the Korean market regardless of whether the conduct 
occurred within or outside of Korea. 
If NPEs’ behavior raises a legitimate antitrust concern, their behavior 
(NPEs): How NPEs and Defensive Patent Aggregators Will Change the License Market, les 
nouvelles 56, 58 (Mar. 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1935524.
42) An American commentator noted that, in the U.S., legal fees would be about $500,000 
through the summary judgment stage, and could become $4 million or more if a lawsuit 
reaches the trial stage. See, Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 seton Hall l. rev. 457, 467 
(2012).
43) See Bruce H. Kobayashi, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Koren W. Wong-Ervin, and Joshua D. 
Wright, Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, George Mason University School of Law, on the 
Korea Fair Trade Commission’s Revised Review Guidelines on Unfair Exercise of Intellectual Property 
Rights 17 (George Mason Legal Studies Research Paper No. LS 15-35 / George Mason Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. 15-45, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2669510 
(providing a commentary to the IPR Guidelines and characterizing the significance of NPEs’ 
activities in the U.S. inherently as a “litigation problem” and noting that such litigation 
problem is neither new or specific to NPEs). 
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would need to be analyzed, of course. At the same time, however, it is 
unclear if NPEs’ behavior should be treated differently from other types of 
entities in and of itself. The fact that there is a separate section in the IPR 
Guidelines perhaps suggests that the KFTC is much concerned about NPEs’ 
activities in general, although the IPR Guidelines mention certain positive 
roles that NPEs may play. It should be noted that, in principle, antitrust 
enforcement should be based on the conduct not on the actor. Certain types 
of NPE activities would be conducive to competition and innovation in 
general, while certain other types of NPE activities may show the opposite 
impact. As such, at least for now, it is unclear if there is a need for special 
regulatory provisions only applicable to NPEs in Korea. A more adequate 
inquiry would focus on the activities of the parties and not on the nature or 
identity of the parties. In fact, most of the provisions in the section on NPEs 
in the IPR Guidelines are derived from various antitrust principles which 
would be applicable to NPEs and non-NPEs alike.  
A main focus of antitrust scrutiny as to whether the exercise of patent 
rights is anticompetitive or unfair should inherently lie in examining the 
economic impact of the conduct. There is no reason to think that different 
antitrust doctrines should apply between NPEs and non-NPEs. Recent 
courts’ decisions on patent-related antitrust cases, including the GSK/
Dong-A case, the Apple v. Samsung case, and the Qualcomm case, should 
also be applicable to a case where antitrust concerns are raised in the 
context of an NPE’s exercise of its rights. 
 

